# SEXUAL ATTITUDES, GENDER AND SOCIAL POSITION

# EUROPEAN SOCIOLOGICAL CONFERENCE TORUN, 10-11 SEPTEMBER 2005

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This paper presents empirical analysis about sexual attitudes, gender and social position. I focus in people idea about what is a valid sexual relationship. For some people, the sexual relationship is valid when it was done with the sole purpose of procreation, but other people are in disagreeing with this. I find differences about sex, social position and other variables: educational level, age and religiosity. I present some hypothesis to explain this empirical evidence with Spanish data set.

### SOMETHING ABOUT SPAIN

Two issue about Spain are very relevant to understand this research: Spain is a catholic country and has a familiaristic welfare regime.

Spain is catholic country, about 85% of Spaniard say they are catholics, but the people who attend the mass is less. Nowadays there are a little more people of different religions, because the immigration is growing up fast. Spanish is all Catholic country from 16th century, when the *Catholic Kings* (Isabel and Fernando) expelled Jews and Muslims from Spain. In 19th century, the secular movement grew up, and it fought again Catholic Church, some times civil wars between liberal-secular people and traditional-catholic people. In 20th century (1936-1939) there was the Civil War between fascist and democratic and communist forces. The fascist won and they stay in the Government until the Dictator Franco died (1975). The Civil War and the years after were very bloody, and the political and religious repression was very hard. After the Civil War, it took a long time to recover from the severe fall in the level of economic development, which did not begin to recover until the late fifties. During the sixties, Spain turned from an agrarian economy to an industrial and services oriented one. The ideological framework of the dictatorial regime, today known as 'National-Catholicism', which was a mixture of elements of fascist and corporatist ideology with catholic fundamentalism, ensured a considerable institutional weight to the Catholic Church. In 1978 born a democratic system, after Franco died. The new Constitution set up separation between State and Religion. But the new State isn't secular; it's no denominational. In secular State, all religions are equal and they are personal bussines, but in no denominational State, the main religion has a special status.

For example, the Spanish State collections money for Catholic Church and the Catholic Church has privileges in educative system and tax.

Spain is a 'familialistic' welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen 1999). Those are the regimes which allocate a great welfare burden on the shoulders of the traditional family. Obvious examples are Italy and Spain. In these countries, the vast majority of the population is catholic. This fact has led some authors to overstress the importance of catholic moral norms to explain some behaviour, like the low rate of divorce. This argument is questionable if we just take into account the increasing levels of secularization of Spanish society from the sixties on. Besides, this kind of argument could not explain why, for instance, catholic moral norms are largely ignored with regard to other family issues, notably fertility. However, an explanation based in the institutional structure of familialistic welfare regimes may account of both phenomena. The welfare regime hinders women' participation in the labour market. And the very existence of non traditional households is made "institutionally" difficult in many ways (starting by such apparently trivial things as the tight regulation on the hours at which shops may be open). It is more reasonable to suppose that the influence of Catholic religion takes place at the macro level: on the one hand, in the historical genesis of this kind of societies, on the other, in recent times, the Catholic Church, as an institution, tried to bloc or, at least, slow down, the enactment of family relate legislation (such as divorce), or to restrict its contents.

### **HYPOTHESIS**

Buss and Barnes (1986) present *structural powerlessness and sex role socialization* hypothesis in a paper about preferences in human mate selection (p. 569):

This hypothesis is that women are typically excluded from power and are viewed as object of exchange. Because of their restricted paths for individual advancement, women seek in mates those characteristics associated with power (....) Men, in contrast, place a premium on the quality of the "exchange object" itself, and so value physical beauty (...) Traditional socialization (...) inculcate role-appropriate values in males and females. This general hypothesis leads to several testable predictions: (...) that those women who do have access to power by possessing monetary resources and education will value good earning capacity less than will women who do not have access to the accoutrements of power (and) that men and women who have been subjected to less traditional sex role socialization will not show this sex difference as strongly as will those raised more traditionally They present other hypothesis ground in evolutionary psychology, but I can't test it with CIS data set. It is possible use rational choice to derive the same test empirical evidence. Other people use rational choice to explain sexual behaviour (Becker & Posner 1993, Posner 1992). It isn't necessary to suppose that people are aware of their rational choice, because the aggregate behaviour of a lot of people under institutional restrictions can be understand like a individual rational choice (Blossfeld & Prein 1998, Goldthorpe 2000). I suggest that the sexual relationship can be understood like a two dimension good. One dimension is consume, sexual pleasure. And the other one is investment, a long term relationship, with commitment. The consume-investment ratio is different for men and women because for women are more difficult find good jobs in market labour. By that and by the structural powerlessness, if women would have a social position like men, then sexual attitudes would be the same (Kanter 1977).

# Data set

The data set is a survey carried by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (Sociological Research Centre, CIS) in 1995. It is a Spanish government public agency. This agency carried a lot of surveys about a lot of public opinion issues. This data set is representative for all adult Spanish people, except Ceuta and Melilla, two little cities in North Africa.

I research about two items: "Sexual relationships are acceptable only in marriage" and "The main goal of sexual relationship is the offspring". There are statistic differences between male and female (Table 1).

		SEX	SEX		TOTAL		
		Male	Female				
		e6	8	olo	CASOS		
Sexual Relationships are accept-	1 Very agree	8,6%	16,0%	12,4%	241		
able only in marriage (χ <sup>2</sup> =45,8 p-	2	16,6%	21,7%	19,2%	375		
valor=0,00)	3	5,9%	3,9%	4,9%	95		
	4	40,5%	36,8%	38,6%	753		
	5 Very desagree	28,1%	20,9%	24,4%	476		
	DOESN'T KNOW	, 3%	,4%	,4%	7		
	DOESN'T ANSWER	,0%	,2%	,1%	2		
		100%	100%	100%	1949		
The main goal of sexual relations	1 Very agree	4,9%	6,4%	5,7%	111		
is the offspring	2	13,9%	15,4%	14,6%	285		
0	3	4,7%	4,9%	4,8%	94		
(χ <sup>2</sup> =13,5 p-value=0,04)	4	42,8%	44,1%	43,5%	846		
	5 Very desagree	33,6%	28,3%	30,9%	601		
	DOESN'T KNOW	,1%	,8%	,5%	9		
	DOESN'T ANSWER	.0%	.1%	.1%	1		

### Table 1 SEXUAL ATTITUDES BY SEX

SOURCE: CIS SURVERY 2157, 1995.

I add those variables in a new variable ("marriage"+"offspring"-1), sexual attitudes index. This new variable is the dependent variable in OLS regression.



### Table 2 Mean t-test by sex.

	T test f	or means	(varianc	e non equal)			
	t	f.d.	Sig. (2	Difference	Standar	95% Interval	. Confidence
			tiles)	between	Error	Low	High
				means			
Sexuality atti-	-4,599	1934,1	,000	-,4768	,1037	-,6801	-,2735
tudes Index							
(1=High, 9=low)							

The independent variables are occupational prestige, religiosity, educational level and age.

**Steep 1- Ocupational prestige:** We use professional prestige scale, PRESCA-2 (Carabaña y Gómez 1996), by the present or last job. In few words, it is an index for job social value. This value is a mixture of job mean wage and mean educational level. The prestige value for a peasant without land is 60, for engineer, 224, for a teacher,

144 or 93 for salesclerk. To improve the output, I divide these values by 10. I make a dummy variable for housewife without labour experience. Favourable dka

Occupational prestige net effect (for modal people in religion, age and educational level)

OCUPATIONAL PRESTIGE	MALE	FEMALE
80	7,09	6,82
200	7,09	7,54
HOUSWIFE		6,49

This is important output: the job is not important for men, but it is important for women. This result is good for "powerless hypothesis", because when the women have power (good job) their attitudes are more similar to men. The housewife is the most different.

**Step 2-Religiosity:** Religiosity (catholic in Spain) is a measure to traditional socialization. I make various dummies variables: non religion, people who attends mass (reference category), people attends mass several times in a year, some times in a month, and more.

	MALE	FEMALE
AGNOSTIC OR ATHEIST	7,25	6,61
ATTENDING MASS ONLY FEW TIMES	7,09	6,34
ATTENDING MASS SOME TIMES IN A YEAR	6,29	6,22
ATTENDING MASS SOME TIMES IN A MONTH	5,98	5,99
ATTENDING MASS MORE	5,65	5,46

This output is good for powerless hypothesis too. We can see the difference between men and women are lower when the people are more religious, because they are more socialized in traditional values.

**Steep 3-Educational level:** This variable is an indicator for culture and economic level. The high level educated people have more information, and they can change traditional values. This people have higher earnings and low unemployment rates, and the women have a higher economical activity rate.

. . . . \_ \_\_\_. . . . \_

	MALE	FEMALE
NOT COMPLETED ANY STUDIES	6,29	5,75
PRIMARY LEVEL	7,09	6,34
VOCATIONAL SECUNDARY	7,61	7,04
ACADEMIC SECUNDARY	7,5	6,77
UNIVERSITY	7,85	6,95

The educational level is a positive effect over the index.

**Step 4-Age:** This variable has various dimensions. One is individual, because in different age the people has different resources, health, expectations, resources, etc..., the life cycle is not the same. Other one is social, because the people grow up in moments with different values.

	MALE	FEMALE
18-25	7,63	6,6
26-35	7,09	6,34
36-45	6,75	5,8
45-65	5,86	4,38

The age effect is the most negative in all categories variables. Perhaps, this is because in this variable socialization effect and economic resources effects are stronger. The oldest people grown up in the dictatorship: no differences in women who grow up under democratic period. In economic effect, the older women and men have a tipical family, with a man "breadwinner", and the conservative attitudes are more important to this kind of families.

#### COMMENT

This evidence is robust and favourable to the "powerless" hypothesis. Other researches find opposite evidence (Buss 2003, Buss et al. 2001, Todosijevic et al. 2003, Wiederman & Allgeier 1992), and another one, positive evidence (Kasser & Sharma 1999). One important difference in this research is the sample: this sample is representative for all population, but the another samples are only for students. By that, the other samples could be self-selection problem.

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# Panel 1 REGRESIONES (POR MCO) VARIABLE DEPENDIENTE: ÍNDICE DE SEXUALIDAD CATÓLICA (1=ALTA, 9=BAJA)

MALE	В	S.E.	Sig.	В	.E.	Sig.	B	S.E.	Sig.	В	S.E.	Sig.
<sup>1</sup> CONSTANT	6,02	0,23	0,00	6,50	0,23	0,00	6,91	0,23	0,00	7,09	0,25	0,00
PROFESSIONAL PRESTIGE INDEX	0,03	0,02	0,09	0,03	0,02	0,09	-0,02	0,02	0,28	0,00	0,02	0,98
MISSING PRESCA2	0,47	0,39	0,23	0,36	0,37	0,32	-0,36	0,37	0,34	-0,03	0,36	0,94
STUDENTS AND UNEMPLOYMENT WITHOUT EXPERIENCE	0,77	0,37	0,04	0,77	0,35	0,03	0,44	0,34	0,19	-0,39	0,35	0,27
<sup>2</sup> AGNOSTIC OR SIMILAR				0,31	0,22	0,15	0,26	0,21	0,21	0,16	0,20	0,43
ATTENDING MASS SOME TIMES IN A YEAR				-1,02	0,20	0,00	-0,96	0,19	0,00	-0,80	0,18	0,00
ATTENDING MASS SOME TIMES IN A MONTH				-1,59	0,26	0,00	-1,45	0,25	0,00	-1,11	0,25	0,00
ATTENDING MASS MORE				-1,78	0,21	0,00	-1,77	0,20	0,00	-1,44	0,20	0,00
<sup>3</sup> NOT COMPLETED ANY STUDIES							-1,29	0,22	0,00	-0,80	0,22	0,00
VOCATIONAL SECUNDARY							0,84	0,21	0,00	0,52	0,20	0,01
ACADEMIC SECUNDARY							0,66	0,19	0,00	0,41	0,19	0,03
UNIVERSITY							0,89	0,22	0,00	0,76	0,21	0,00
<sup>4</sup> 18-25										0,54	0,20	0,01
36-45										-0,34	0,19	0,07
45-65										-1,23	0,18	0,00
n=988 R <sup>2</sup> ADJ.=	0,02		-	0,12			0,19			0,25		
FEMALE	в	S.E.	Sig.									
1 CONSTANT	5,17	0,29	0,00	5,58	0,29	0,00	6,02	0,29	0,00	6,34	0,29	0,00
PROFESSIONAL PRESTIGE INDEX	0,12	0,03	0,00	0,12	0,03	0,00	0,04	0,03	0,17	0,06	0,03	0,02
MISSING PRESCA2	0,59	0,47	0,21	0,78	0,45	0,08	-0,06	0,45	0,89	0,23	0,42	0,59
STUDENTS AND UNEMPLOYMENT WITHOUT EXPERIENCE	1,64	0,41	0,00	1,43	0,39	0,00	0,99	0,38	0,01	0,37	0,38	0,33
HOUSWIFE	-0,68	0,38	0,08	-0,48	0,37	0,19	-0,12	0,35	0,73	0,15	0,33	0,66
2 AGNOSTIC OR SIMILAR				0,41	0,29	0,15	0,30	0,28	0,28	0,27	0,26	0,31
ATTENDING MASS SOME TIMES IN A YEAR				-0,42	0,19	0,03	-0,29	0,18	0,12	-0,12	0,17	0,48
ATTENDING MASS SOME TIMES IN A MONTH				-0,81	0,24	0,00	-0,64	0,23	0,01	-0,35	0,22	0,11
ATTENDING MASS MORE				-1,75	0,17	0,00	-1,50	0,17	0,00	-0,88	0,17	0,00
<sup>3</sup> NOT COMPLETED ANY STUDIES							-1,21	0,20	0,00	-0,59	0,20	0,00
VOCATIONAL SECUNDARY							1,17	0,24	0,00	0,70	0,23	0,00
ACADEMIC SECUNDARY							0,84	0,21	0,00	0,43	0,20	0,03
UNIVERSITY							1,04	0,23	0,00	0,61	0,22	0,01
<b>4</b> <sub>18-25</sub>										0,26	0,21	0,23
36-45										-0,54	0,19	0,00
45-65										-1,96	0,19	0,00
N =949 R <sup>2</sup> ajustado=	0,13			0,22			0,28			0,37		

**REFERENCE GROUP (OMITED CATEGORIES) IS THE MODAL PERSON**, with labor experience, attend mass only few times, primary level studies, betwen 26 y 36 years old.

Ocupational Prestige		Mean	SD	n	
SEX	Male	10,7	3,8	788	
	Female	10,2	3,8	462	
TOTAL		10,5	3,8	1250	

		SEX				
		FEMALE MALE TOTAL				
		%	%	%	n	
SEXUAL	1,00	5,3%	3,3%	4,3%	83	
	2,00	3,3%	2,2%	2,8%	54	
INDEX	3,00	11,3%	8,1%	9,7%	189	
	4,00	7,0%	4,5%	5,8%	112	
	5,00	12,7%	12,8%	12,8%	248	
	6,00	3,7%	4,6%	4,2%	81	
	7,00	30,4%	31,8%	31,1%	603	
	8,00	6,3%	8,2%	7,2%	140	
	9,00	19,9%	24,4%	22,1%	429	
	TOTAL	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	1939	
RELIGIOSITY	AGNOSTIC OR ATHEIST	6,4%	12,2%	9,2%	177	
	ATTENDING MASS FEW TIMES*	39,0%	51,2%	45,0%	862	
	ATTENDING MASS SOME TIMES IN A YEAR	19,6%	16,8%	18,2%	349	
	ATTENDING MASS SOME TIMES IN A MONTH	9,9%	7,5%	8,7%	167	
	ATTENDING MASS MORE	25,1%	12,4%	18,9%	362	
	TOTAL	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	1917	
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL	NOT COMPLETED ANY STUDIES	13,4%	10,6%	12,1%	223	
	PRIMARY*	45,2%	42,0%	43,7%	807	
	VOCATIONAL SECUNDARY	9,9%	12,6%	11,3%	208	
	ACADEMIC SECUNDARY	17,1%	19,0%	18,0%	333	
	UNIVERSITY	14.3%	15,7%	15,0%	277	
	TOTAL	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	1848	
AGE	18-25	22,0%	22,7%	22,3%	435	
	25-35*	24,6%	25,2%	24,9%	485	
	36-45	19,0%	19,3%	19,1%	373	
	45-65	34,4%	32,8%	33,6%	655	
	TOTAL	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	1948	

SOURCE: SURVEY 2157, CIS 1995 (\*) REFERENCES CATEGORIES IN REGRESSION



SEXUALITY SEXUAL ATTITUDES, GENDER AND SOCIAL POSITION José Saturnino Martínez García

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[ROUGH DRAFT]

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(1=High, 9=low)							

The independent variables are occupational prestige, religiosity, educational level and age.

**Steep 1- Ocupational prestige:** We use professional prestige scale, PRESCA-2 (Carabaña y Gómez 1996), by the present or last job. In few words, it is an index for job social value. This value is a mixture of job mean wage

and mean educational level. The prestige value for a peasant without land is 60, for engineer, 224, for a teacher, 144 or 93 for salesclerk. To improve the output, I divide these values by 10. I make a dummy variable for housewife without labour experience. Favourable dka

Occupational prestige net effect (for modal people in religion, age and educational level)

OCUPATIONAL PRESTIGE	MALE	FEMALE
80	7,09	6,82
200	7,09	7,54
HOUSWIFE		6,49

This is important output: the job is not important for men, but it is important for women. This result is good for "powerless hypothesis", because when the women have power (good job) their attitudes are more similar to men. The housewife is the most different.

**Step 2-Religiosity:** Religiosity (catholic in Spain) is a measure to traditional socialization. I make various dummies variables: non religion, people who attends mass (reference category), people attends mass several times in a year, some times in a month, and more.

	MALE	FEMALE
AGNOSTIC OR ATHEIST	7,25	6,61
ATTENDING MASS ONLY FEW TIMES	7,09	6,34
ATTENDING MASS SOME TIMES IN A YEAR	6,29	6,22
ATTENDING MASS SOME TIMES IN A MONTH	5,98	5,99
ATTENDING MASS MORE	5,65	5,46

This output is good for powerless hypothesis too. We can see the difference between men and women are lower when the people are more religious, because they are more socialized in traditional values.

**Steep 3-Educational level:** This variable is an indicator for culture and economic level. The high level educated people have more information, and they can change traditional values. This people have higher earnings and low unemployment rates, and the women have a higher economical activity rate.

	MALE	FEMALE
NOT COMPLETED ANY STUDIES	6,29	5,75
PRIMARY LEVEL	7,09	6,34

VOCATIONAL SECUNDARY	7,61	7,04
ACADEMIC SECUNDARY	7,5	6,77
UNIVERSITY	7,85	6,95

The educational level is a positive effect over the index.

**Step 4-Age:** This variable has various dimensions. One is individual, because in different age the people has different resources, health, expectations, resources, etc..., the life cycle is not the same. Other one is social, because the people grow up in moments with different values.

	MALE	FEMALE
18-25	7,63	6,6
26-35	7,09	6,34
36-45	6,75	5,8
45-65	5,86	4,38

The age effect is the most negative in all categories variables. Perhaps, this is because in this variable socialization effect and economic resources effects are stronger. The oldest people grown up in the dictatorship: no differences in women who grow up under democratic period. In economic effect, the older women and men have a tipical family, with a man "breadwinner", and the conservative attitudes are more important to this kind of families.

#### COMMENT

This evidence is robust and favourable to the "powerless" hypothesis. Other researches find opposite evidence (Buss 2003, Buss et al. 2001, Todosijevic et al. 2003, Wiederman & Allgeier 1992), and another one, positive evidence (Kasser & Sharma 1999). One important difference in this research is the sample: this sample is representative for all population, but the another samples are only for students. By that, the other samples could be self-selection problem.

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# Panel 1 REGRESIONES (POR MCO) VARIABLE DEPENDIENTE: ÍNDICE DE SEXUALIDAD CATÓLICA (1=ALTA, 9=BAJA)

MALE	В	S.E.	Sig.	В	.E.	Sig.	В	S.E.	Sig.	В	S.E.	Sig.
		0,23	0,00	6,50	0,23	0,00	6,91	0,23	0,00	7,09	0,25	0,00
PROFESSIONAL PRESTIGE INDEX	0,03	0,02	0,09	0,03	0,02	0,09	-0,02	0,02	0,28	0,00	0,02	0,98
MISSING PRESCA2	0,47	0,39	0,23	0,36	0,37	0,32	-0,36	0,37	0,34	-0,03	0,36	0,94
STUDENTS AND UNEMPLOYMENT WITHOUT	0,77	0,37	0,04	0,77	0,35	0,03	0,44	0,34	0,19	-0,39	0,35	0,27
<sup>2</sup> AGNOSTIC OR SIMILAR				0,31	0,22	0,15	0,26	0,21	0,21	0,16	0,20	0,43
ATTENDING MASS SOME TIMES IN A YEAR				-1,02	0,20	0,00	-0,96	0,19	0,00	-0,80	0,18	0,00
ATTENDING MASS SOME TIMES IN A MONTH				-1,59	0,26	0,00	-1,45	0,25	0,00	-1,11	0,25	0,00
ATTENDING MASS MORE				-1,78	0,21	0,00	-1,77	0,20	0,00	-1,44	0,20	0,00
<sup>3</sup> NOT COMPLETED ANY STUDIES							-1,29	0,22	0,00	-0,80	0,22	0,00
VOCATIONAL SECUNDARY							0,84	0,21	0,00	0,52	0,20	0,01
ACADEMIC SECUNDARY							0,66	0,19	0,00	0,41	0,19	0,03
UNIVERSITY							0,89	0,22	0,00	0,76	0,21	0,00
<sup>4</sup> 18-25										0,54	0,20	0,01
36-45										-0,34	0,19	0,07
45-65										-1,23	0,18	0,00
n=988 R <sup>2</sup> ADJ.=	0,02		0,12			0,19		0,25				
FEMALE		S.E.	Sig.	В	S.E.	Sig.	В	S.E.	Sig.	В	S.E.	Sig.
1 CONSTANT	5,17	0,29	0,00	5,58	0,29	0,00	6,02	0,29	0,00	6,34	0,29	0,00
PROFESSIONAL PRESTIGE INDEX	0,12	0,03	0,00	0,12	0,03	0,00	0,04	0,03	0,17	0,06	0,03	0,02
MISSING PRESCA2	0,59	0,47	0,21	0,78	0,45	0,08	-0,06	0,45	0,89	0,23	0,42	0,59
STUDENTS AND UNEMPLOYMENT WITHOUT	1,64	0,41	0,00	1,43	0,39	0,00	0,99	0,38	0,01	0,37	0,38	0,33
HOUSWIFE	-0,68	0,38	0,08	-0,48	0,37	0,19	-0,12	0,35	0,73	0,15	0,33	0,66
2 AGNOSTIC OR SIMILAR				0,41	0,29	0,15	0,30	0,28	0,28	0,27	0,26	0,31
ATTENDING MASS SOME TIMES IN A YEAR				-0,42	0,19	0,03	-0,29	0,18	0,12	-0,12	0,17	0,48
ATTENDING MASS SOME TIMES IN A MONTH				-0,81	0,24	0,00	-0,64	0,23	0,01	-0,35	0,22	0,11
ATTENDING MASS MORE				-1,75	0,17	0,00	-1,50	0,17	0,00	-0,88	0,17	0,00
<sup>3</sup> NOT COMPLETED ANY STUDIES							-1,21	0,20	0,00	-0,59	0,20	0,00
VOCATIONAL SECUNDARY							1,17	0,24	0,00	0,70	0,23	0,00
ACADEMIC SECUNDARY							0,84	0,21	0,00	0,43	0,20	0,03
UNIVERSITY							1,04	0,23	0,00	0,61	0,22	0,01
<b>4</b> <sub>18-25</sub>										0,26	0,21	0,23
36-45										-0,54	0,19	0,00
45-65										-1,96	0,19	0,00
N =949 R <sup>2</sup> ajustado=	0,13			0,22			0,28			0,37		

**REFERENCE GROUP (OMITED CATEGORIES) IS THE MODAL PERSON**, with labor experience, attend mass only few times, primary level studies, betwen 26 y 36 years old.

Ocupational Prestige		Mean	SD	n
SEX	Male	10,7	3,8	788
	Female	10,2	3,8	462
TOTAL		10,5	3,8	1250

		SEX					
		FEMALE MALE TOTAL					
		%	%	%	n		
SEXUAL	1,00	5,3%	3,3%	4,3%	83		
	2,00	3,3%	2,2%	2,8%	54		
INDEX	3,00	11,3%	8,1%	9,7%	189		
	4,00	7,0%	4,5%	5,8%	112		
	5,00	12,7%	12,8%	12,8%	248		
	6,00	3,7%	4,6%	4,2%	81		
	7,00	30,4%	31,8%	31,1%	603		
	8,00	6,3%	8,2%	7,2%	140		
	9,00	19,9%	24,4%	22,1%	429		
	TOTAL	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	1939		
RELIGIOSITY	AGNOSTIC OR ATHEIST	6,4%	12,2%	9,2%	177		
	ATTENDING MASS FEW TIMES*	39,0%	51,2%	45,0%	862		
	ATTENDING MASS SOME TIMES IN A YEAR	19,6%	16,8%	18,2%	349		
	ATTENDING MASS SOME TIMES IN A MONTH	9,9%	7,5%	8,7%	167		
	ATTENDING MASS MORE	25,1%	12,4%	18,9%	362		
	TOTAL	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	1917		
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL	NOT COMPLETED ANY STUDIES	13,4%	10,6%	12,1%	223		
	PRIMARY*	45.2%	42.0%	43.7%	807		
	VOCATIONAL SECUNDARY	9,9%	12,6%	11,3%	208		
	ACADEMIC SECUNDARY	17,1%	19.0%	18.0%	333		
	UNIVERSITY	14,3%	15,7%	15,0%	277		
	TOTAL	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	1848		
AGE	18-25	22,0%	22,7%	22,3%	435		
	25-35*	24,6%	25,2%	24,9%	485		
	36-45	19,0%	19,3%	19,1%	373		
	45-65	34,4%	32,8%	33,6%	655		
	TOTAL	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	1948		

SOURCE: SURVEY 2157, CIS 1995

## (\*) REFERENCES CATEGORIES IN REGRESSION